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RECENT CASE
THE RESURRECTION OF STATE REGULATION OF
CASH TENDER OFFERS: CARDIFF ACQUISITIONS,
INC. V. HATCH, 751 F.2d (8th Cir. 1984)
The recent conquests of corporate "raiders"' such as T. Boone
Pickens, Carl Icahn, and others have focused national attention2 upon
a popular corporate takeover device-the cash tender offer.3 The con-
troversy surrounding tender offers centers on the potential adverse ef-
fects that corporate takeovers may have on interested shareholders, the
national economy, and the states in which the target corporation is
domiciled or does business. While in theory both state 4 and
1. The term "corporate raider" will be used to designate any party who seeks to gain
control of a target corporation via a hostile takeover. The term, as used herein, is not limited
to acquiring parties who seek control with the intent to liquidate the assets or "bust up" the
target company after the takeover.
2. See, e.g., Loomis, The Comeuppance of Carl Icahn, FORTUNE, Feb. 17, 1986, at 18
(cover story on Carl Icahn's acquisition of TWA); Petre, Merger Fees that Bend the Mind,
FORTUNE, Jan. 20, 1986, at 18 (cover story on fees of investment bankers in corporate mergers);
Ehrbar, Have Takeovers Gone to Far? FORTUNE, May 27, 1985, at 20 (cover story analyzing
the benefits and drawbacks of corporate takeovers); Sloan, Why is No One Safe? FORBES,
March 11, 1985, at 134 (cover story); Greenwald, High Times for T. Boone Pickens, TIME
MAGAZINE, March 4, 1985, at 57 (cover story detailing the tactics of corporate raider, T. Boone
Pickens); Kirkland, When Paying Off A Raider Benefits The Shareholders, FORTUNE, April 30,
1984, at 152 (special "Fortune 500" issue).
3. A tender offer is generally defined as a publicly made solicitation to the shareholders
of a target corporation to tender their shares to the offeror at the designated price, which is
usually above the market price. See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE
CONTROL 70 (1973); Einhorn & Blackburn, The Developing Concept of "Tender Offer": An
Analysis of the Judicial and Administrative Interpretations of the Term, 23 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 379 (1978); Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1250, 1251 (1973).
4. Thirty-eight states have passed legislation regarding corporate takeovers. See ALASKA
STAT. §§ 45.57.010 to .120 (1980); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 67-1264 to -1264.14 (1980); COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 11-51.5-101 to .5-108 (repealed 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-456 to -468
(West 1981 & Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 517.35
to .363 (repealed 1979); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 22-1901 to -1915 (1977 & Supp. 1982); HAWAII
REV. STAT. §§ 417E-1 to-15 (1976 & Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1501 to -1513 (1980 &
Supp. 1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, §§ 137.51 to .70 (repealed 1983); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 32, § 7.85 (1985); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-3.1-1 to -3.1-11 (West Supp. 1983-84); IowA
CODE ANN. §§ 502.211 to .215 (West Supp. 1984-85); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-1276 to -1284
(1981); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 292.560 to .991 (Bobbs-Merrill 1981 & Supp. 1982); id. §§
271A.3% to .399 (Supp. 1984); LA. REV. STAT. §§ 51:1500 to :1512 (West Supp. 1985); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 801 to 817 (Supp. 1984-85); MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§
11-901 to -908 (1985); id. §§ 3-601 to -603; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. Il0c, §§ I to 13 (West
Supp. 1985); MicH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 451.810 to .814 (West 1983 & Supp. 1985); MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 80B.01 to .13 (West Supp. 1984); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 75-72-101 to -121 (Supp.
1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 409.500 to .565 (Vernon 1979); id. § 351.407 (Vernon Supp. 1985-
86); NE. REV. STAT. §§ 21-2419 to -2430 (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 78.376-.3788 (1979)
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federal' governments currently regulate tender offers, case law has ef-
fectively emasculated the power of states to legislate in this area.6
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, however,
recently resurrected the notion that states may, to some extent, regulate
tender offers. The Eighth Circuit's controversial decision, Cardiff Acquisi-
tions, Inc. v. Hatch,7 upheld the constitutionality of the Minnesota Corporate
Take-Overs Act8 against interstate commerce9 and supremacy clause 0 chal-
lenges. The Cardiff decision therefore represents a major departure from the
concepts of federalism articulated in the seminal Supreme Court case of
Edgar v. MITE Corp." and its progeny, and poses practical problems for
future corporate acquisitions.
In order to emphasize the impact that the Cardiff decision could have,
this Recent Case first outlines the historical context in which state and federal
securities regulation developed, and examines the corresponding case law.
Next, this Recent Case analyzes and evaluates the Eighth Circuit's rationale
in upholding the constitutionality of the Minnesota Corporate Take-Overs
Act. This Recent Case also assesses the impact that the Cardiff decision could
have on future judicial and legislative action, and its potential ramifications
on hostile corporate acquisitions. In conclusion, this Recent Case suggests
(amended 1981); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 421.A:I to :16 (1983 & Supp. 1985); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 49:5-1 to :19 (West Supp. 1985); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1600 to 1614 (McKinney
Supp. 1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 78B-1 to -i (1985); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.83.1 to
.83.2, 1707.04.1 to .04.2 (Page 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 431 to 450 (repealed 1985);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §§ 71 to 85 (Purdon Supp. 1985); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 35-2-10 to -110
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 47-32-1 to -48 (Supp. 1983); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 48-2101 to -2114 (1979 & Supp. 1983); Texas Administrative Guidelines for
Minimum Standards in Tender Offers, §§ 065.15.00.100 to .800, reprinted in 3 BLurI SKY L.
REP. (CCH) 55,671-55,682; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 61-4-1 to -13 (repealed 1983); Va. Code §§
13.1528 to -541 (1978 & Supp. 1983) (amended 1983); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 552.01 to .25 (West
Special Pamphlet 1983).
5. Federal regulation of cash tender offers is embodied in 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-
(f) (1976), popularly known as the Williams Act. For a discussion of the history of the Williams
Act, see infra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
6. For an exhaustive list of cases in which state takeover statutes were found to be
unconstitutional, see infra note 44.
7. 751 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1984).
8. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 80B.01 to .13 (1984).
9. Interstate commerce challenges to the validity of state takeover statutes center on the
belief that state tender offer regulation effects more than just intrastate activities and therefore
interferes with Congressional authority under the commerce clause. The commerce clause states
that, "Congress shall have Power ... to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States .... U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
10. Supremacy clause, or preemption challenges, are based on the proposition that the
procedures or purposes of state takeover statutes conflict with the federal Williams Act. The
supremacy clause states, in relevant part, "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the Supreme law of the land ......
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
11. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
[Vol. 34:11091110
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that explicit federal preemption of tender offer regulation would clarify both
the federalism and corporate control problems that arise from the present
dual system of regulation, while also ensuring the protection of shareholders.
BACKGROUND
Securities regulation in the United States began over 100 years ago" with
the enactment of state "blue sky" laws.' 3 Blue sky laws were designed to
protect investors from the fraudulent and deceptive sales of securities. ' 4 Since
state regulation of securities was limited to intrastate activities, 5 the United
States Congress perceived a need for regulation on a nationwide scale.
Congress therefore enacted the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act) 6 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act)' 7 to ensure investor protection
in interstate securities transactions." Congress also made it clear, in section
28(A) of the 1934 Act,' 9 that state regulation was not preempted so long as
it did not conflict with the federal scheme.
While both state blue sky laws and the federal securities acts were intended
to protect potential investors, their respective philosophies were quite dif-
ferent. The federal government premised its legislation upon the belief that
12. The first known blue sky law can be traced to a 1903 Connecticut statute that required
mining and oil corporations to file with the Secretary of State before offering their stock. See
L. Loss & E. COWETT, BLUE SKY LAW 5 (1958).
13. The phrase "blue sky laws" is said to have originated in the notion that certain securities
had no more substance than the blue sky itself. See State v. Cushing, 137 Me. 112, 15 A.2d
740 (1940). See also L. Loss & E. COWETT, supra note 12, at 7 n.22 (citing Molvey, Blue Sky
Law, 36 CAN. L.R. 37 (1916) (attributing its origin to the fact that promoters were so fradulent
as to sell lots in the blue sky)).
14. L. Loss & E. COWETT, supra note 12, at 3.
15. The intrastate nature of state blue sky laws supported their constitutionality. See Hall
v. Geirger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S.
559 (1917); Merrick v. N.W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917). The validity of such laws was
not affected by the Supreme Court's decision in Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 641
(1982), which invalidated the Illinois Business Takeover Act.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 77(a)-(h), 770) (1982). The 1933 Act is primarily concerned with the initial
distribution of securities and requires certain issuers to file registration statements with the SEC
and distribute a prospectus to potential buyers. The prospectus must contain information that
would enable the investor to make an informed decision on whether to buy the offered stock.
See generally H. SOWARDS, FEDERAL SECURITIES ACT 102 (1984).
17. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982). The 1934 Act primarily regulates the post distribution
trading of stock rather than its initial issuances, and also is concerned with the functioning of
securities markets. See generally E. GADSBY, FEDERAL SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT 1.01 (1984).
18. See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933); S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess. 6-7 (1933).
19. Section 28(a) provides that: "Nothing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the
securities commission . . . of any State over any security or any person insofar as it does not
conflict with the provisions of this title or the rules and regulations thereunder." 15 U.S.C. §
78bb(a) (1976). See infra note 135 and accompanying text for support of the proposition that
§ 28(a) is not applicable to the Williams Act.
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investors are best protected through full disclosure of all material information
regarding a securities transaction.20 State legislation, on the other hand,
evidenced a more paternalistic approach by often addressing the substantive
or qualitative aspects of the securities involved. 21 This philosophical diver-
gence foreshadowed much of the difficulty surrounding subsequent tender
offer legislation.
Since neither state blue sky laws nor the federal securities acts addressed
the takeover device of the cash tender offer, a large gap developed in the
regulatory scheme. Parties who sought to gain control of a corporation could
circumvent the registration and disclosure requirements associated with proxy
fights22 and exchange offers 23 by making a direct cash offer to the share-
holders of the target corporation for their common stock at a premium over
the market price. 24 The offeror thereby avoided two events that triggered
state and federal securities laws: the issuance of securities and the solicitation
of proxies. Cash tender offers also enabled the acquiring party to deal
directly with the corporation's shareholders rather than the often hostile
incumbent management. 2 As a result, the tender offer became a favorite
20. The federal disclosure requirements evidence Congress' "market approach" to share-
holder protection; this approach allows the investor to determine the merits of the proposed
transaction after both sides have presented all relevant information. See S. REP. No. 550, 90th
Cong.. 1st Sess. 3 (1967); H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1968 U.S.
CODE CoNo. & AD. NEWS 2811. See also Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 557 F.2d 1256,
1276 (1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173
(1979).
21. See L. Loss & E. CowEar, supra note 12, at 36-38 (noting that state disclosure
requirements are significant only with respect to the quality of the information, rather than its
mere sufficiency).
22. Proxy solicitation, which was the favored means of usurping control from incumbent
management prior to the use of cash tender offers, is regulated under the 1934 Act. See also
E. ARA.ow & H. EINHORN, supra note 3, at 65-66.
23. Exchange offers, in which the acquiring corporation offers to purchase the shares of
the target corporation in exchange for its own stock, constitute an issuance of securities and
are therefore subject to regulation under 15 U.S.C. § 77e.
24, For extensive analyses of the rationale for offering substantial premiums to target
shareholders, compare Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of Target's Management in
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HAutv. L. Rv. 1165-74 (1981) (espousing the "efficient
capital market theory" that the price of a stock reflects its value since it embodies all known
information about the company) with Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35
Bus. LAW. 106-08 (1979) (articulating the view that the market price of a stock is not indicative
of its value and that premiums on offers take advantage of that discrepancy. See also Penn,
Premiums: What Do They Really Measure? 16 MERo. & AcQ. 30-34 (1981).
25. While shareholders are primarily interested in the stock for investment purposes and
will tender their shares if it is profitable to do so, management has the additional interest of
retaining their employment positions in the target corporation. As a result, incumbent man-
agement may reject profitable offers in order to retain those positions. See infra notes 168-69
and accompanying text.
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vehicle for corporate acquisitions during the 1960's.26
Because the tender offer was not subject to either branch of the dual
system of securities regulation, numerous abuses arose. For instance, the
identity and intent of offerors were often unknown since there were no
registration or disclosure requirements. 27 An offeror could also pressure
shareholders into selling their stock by offering a substantial premium over
the current market value, leaving the offer open for a very short time, and
disclosing only certain information.28 The combination of the high premium
and short time period often discouraged shareholders from holding their
stock to determine if the offer was actually in their best interest.
In 1968, Virginia became the first state to respond to the abuses involved
in cash tender offers. 29 Four months after the enactment of the Virginia
takeover statute, Congress passed the Williams Act3 ° to amend the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. Congress designed the Williams Act to close the gap
that cash tender offers had created in the federal scheme of regulation.3'
Subsequent to the Williams Act, thirty-seven states passed corporate takeover
acts to regulate cash tender offers.3 2
The purpose of the Williams Act was two-fold. Congress structured the
Act to ensure that the shareholders of the target corporation could make an
informed decision as to whether to tender their stock to the offeror.13 Also,
in order to protect shareholder's interest, Congress carefully designed the Act
to maintain an equilibrium between the offering and target corporations
during cash tender offers. 4 Implicit in this design was the prevalent belief
26. See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 3, at 393, 395. Various factors have been
espoused as influencing the rash of takeovers that appeared in the 1960's, including: the increase
in liquidity of acquiring corporations during that period, the increase in availability of credit,
low price/earnings ratios of target corporations, and the ease of acquiring corporate control.
See, e.g., Note, Commerce Clause Limitations Upon State Regulation of Tender Offers, 47 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1133, 1137-39 (1974).
27. See H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CoNe.
& AD. NEws 2811.
28. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 29 (1977).
29. VA. CODE §§ 13.1-528 to -541 (1978) (effective Mar. 5, 1968).
30. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e); 78n(d)-(f) (1982).
31. See S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., lst Sess. 2-4 (1967), H.R. REP. No. 1711 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. 2-4, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2811. See also Piper v. Chris-
Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 22 (1977).
32. All of those states listed in note 4 supra, except Virginia, passed their statutes after the
Williams Act.
33. See MITE, 457 U.S. at 633, Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 35 (1977); Rondeao
v. Moseinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975); S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4
(1967). The Congressional intent to provide shareholder protection was to be achieved through
full and fair disclosure of relevant information rather than qualitative review of the transaction
itself. See supra note 20.
34. As the Supreme Court stated in MITE: "But it is also crystal clear that a major aspect
of the effort to protect the investor was to avoid favoring either management or the takeover
DEPA UL LA W RE VIEW [Vol. 34:1109
on the federal level that corporate takeovers were not necessarily harmful
to either the shareholder or the economy." In order to achieve the goals of
shareholder protection and control neutrality, the Williams Act required the
offeror to disclose material information concurrently with the commencement
of a tender offer.3 6
State takeover legislation, on the other hand, continued to manifest the
protective or paternalistic ideology apparent in their blue sky laws.17 This
paternalism resulted from the state's desire to protect resident shareholders
and corporations, and to maintain its fiscal integrity. To ensure resident
shareholder protection, state legislation often required hearings on the ade-
quacy of corporate disclosure, merit review of the proposed transactions,
and suspension of tender offers for failure of compliance.3" States also
sought to protect the financial basis of their economy.39 The liquidation or
reincorporation of companies domiciled or doing business in a given state
bidder." MITE, 457 U.S. at 624; See also H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted
in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2811; S.E.C. Rel. No. 34-16384, [1979-80] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 1 82,373 at 82,577 (Nov. 29, 1979). But see Note, Securities Law and the
Constitution: State Tender Offer Statutes Reconsidered. 88 YALE L.J. 522 (1979) (stating that
the neutrality concept was not a purpose, but rather a byproduct of the intent to protect
shareholders).
35. The Supreme Court noted that Congress gradually came to see that takeovers served
the useful purpose of "providing a check on entrenched but inefficient management." MITE,
457 U.S. at 633 (citing S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 3-4 (1967)). The legislative
history of the Williams Act indicates that the first bill proposed by Senator Williams was
specifically designed to protect incumbent management. S. 2731, 89th Cong., 1st Sess,, Ill
CONG. REC. 28,256 (1965). However, Congress' desire to prevent takeovers evolved instead into
a concern for protecting the affected shareholders. As the purpose of the legislation changed,
the notion that corporate takeovers were per se harmful was replaced with the belief that such
changes in control were often beneficial to the target's shareholders. See Note, Attack-Casualties
in the Battle for Corporate Control-MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 30 DE PAUL L. REV. 989, 994-95
(1981). See also Langevoort, State Tender Offer Legislation: Interests, Effects, and Political
Competency, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 213, 217-18 (1977).
36. The procedural aspects of the Williams Act are as follows: an offering party who seeks
to acquire five percent or more of a target corporation's shares must file a Schedule 14D-1
with the SEC while simultaneously commencing the tender offer. The schedule requires disclosure
of the offeror's identity, the source of its funds, its current holding in the target, and its intent
upon acquisition of control. The offeror must deliver this information to both the target
company and its shareholders. The offeror must purchase all shares tendered at the same price.
Shareholders may withdraw tendered shares within a specific time frame. Thus, with the required
filing, the offer could be commenced, and the tendered stock purchased, subject only to
shareholders' right to withdraw.
37. The paternalistic nature of state takeover legislation is often apparent in the legislative
history of such acts. See, for example, infra notes 146-48 and accompanying text. See also
Steinberg, State Law Developments: The Pennsylvania Anti-Takeover Legislation, 12 SEC. REG.
L.J. 184-91 (1984) (analyzing the intent of the Pennsylvania legislature in enacting its anti-
takeover statute).
38. See generally Wilner & Landy, The Tender Trap: State Takeover Statutes and Their
Constitutionality, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 5-9 (1976).
39. See Note, supra note 34, at 528; Note, supra note 35, at 998.
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could significantly decrease tax revenues and increase unemployment. 40
Controversy over the validity of state takeover statutes quickly arose since
they frequently imposed substantial burdens on acquiring corporations. En-
forcement of the statutes often threatened to delay or totally frustrate
nationwide tender offers. Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, decided
in 1978, was the first significant federal appellate court decision in this area. 41
In Kidwell, the Fifth Circuit found that the Idaho Takeover Statute42 violated
the commerce clause and supremacy clause of the Constitution. 43 The Kidwell
decision portended numerous invalidations of other state takeover statutes
on either interstate commerce or preemption grounds." Yet, it was not until
40. See Note, supra note 35, at 998.
41. 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978).
42. IDAHO CODE § 30-1501-13 (Supp. 1977). The Idaho statute was substantially similar to
the Illinois statute struck down in MITE.
43. The Fifth Circuit found that the Idaho Takeover Statute was preempted by federal
legislation since the state's fiduciary approach was incompatible with the Williams Act's market
approach to investor protection. The Idaho act therefore tipped the balance created by the
Williams Act in favor of the target management and frustrated the purpose of the federal
regulation. Kidwell, 577 F.2d at 1279-80. In addition, the court invalidated the Idaho Takeover
Statute under the commerce clause on the ground that the burdens on interstate commerce were
disproportionate to the benefits that the act provided.
44. See, e.g., National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982)
(Missouri statute violates commerce clause and supremacy clause); Kennecott Corp. v. Smith,
637 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1980) (New Jersey statute violates supremacy clause); MITE Corp. v.
Dixon, 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980) (Illinois statute violates commerce and supremacy clauses),
aff'd sub nom. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982); Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell,
577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978) (Idaho statute violates commerce and supremacy clauses), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979); Natomas
Co. v. Bryan, 512 F. Supp. 191 (D. Nev. 1981) (Nevada statute violates commerce and supremacy
clauses); Crane Co. v. Lam, 509 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (Pennsylvania statute violates
commerce and supremacy clauses); Seagram & Sons v. Marley, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,246 (W.D. Okla. July 17, 1981) (Oklahoma statute violates
commerce clause); Empire, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 524 F. Supp. 898 (W.D. Mo. 1981) (Missouri
statute violates commerce and supremacy clauses); Hi-Shear Indus. v. Campbell, [1981 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 197,804 (D.S.C. 1980) (South Carolina statute violates commerce
and supremacy clauses); Brascam Ltd. v. Lassiter, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
RP. (CCH) 98,247 (E.D. La. 1979) (Louisiana statute violates supremacy clause); Dart Indus.
v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. I (S.D. Ind. 1978) (Delaware statute violates commerce and supremacy
clauses); Kelly ex rel. McLaughlin v. Beta-X Corp., 103 Mich. App. 51, 302 N.W.2d 596 (1981)
(Michigan statute violates supremacy clause); Eure v. Grand Metropolitan Ltd., [1980 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 197,694 (N.C. Super Ct. 1980) (North Carolina statute violates
supremacy clause). But see City Investing Co. v. Simcox, 476 F. Supp. 112 (D. Ind. 1979)
(Indiana statute not violative of commerce or supremacy clauses), aff'd on other grounds, 633
F.2d 56 (1980); AMCA Int'l Corp. v. Krouse, 482 F. Supp. 929 (S.D. Ohio 1979) (Ohio statute
not violative of commerce or supremacy clauses); Sharon Steel Corp. v. Whaland, 121 N.H.
607, 433 A.2d 1250 (1981) (New Hampshire statute not violative of commerce or supremacy
clauses), vacated and remanded, 458 U.S. 1101 (1982) (vacated and remanded for consideration
in light of Edgar v. MITE Corp.), rev'd, Sharon Steel Corp. v. Whaland, 466 A.2d 919 (N.H.
1983) (New Hampshire statute violates commerce clause)); Wylain, Inc. v. TRE Corp., 412
A.2d 338 (Del. Ch. 1980) (Delaware statute not violative of commerce or supremacy clauses).
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the United States Supreme Court's 1982 decision in Edgar v. MITE Corp.45
that the fate of state takeover legislation was apparently sealed.
In MITE, the Supreme Court found the Illinois Business Takeover Act 46
to be unconstitutional on the ground that it impermissibly burdened interstate
commerce.4 7 In part, the Illinois statute provided for: a precommencement
waiting period after registration with the Secretary of State, merit review of
the transaction, and extraterritorial (nonresident) restraint of nationwide
tender offers. 4 The Court applied the commerce clause test articulated in
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 49 to determine whether the burdens imposed by
the Illinois act on interstate commerce were excessive in relation to the local
state interests.5 0 The Court first noted that the Secretary's authority to delay
an offer in Illinois threatened nationwide tender offers. Such a delay could
deny nonresident shareholders the right to make a premium upon the sale
of their stock, hinder the reallocation of investor capital to its highest level,
and deprive incumbent management of the incentive to perform well. 5 The
Court then found that while the state had an interest in protecting resident
shareholders, no such interest existed with respect to nonresident sharehold-
ers. 2 Even with respect to resident shareholders, the Court determined that
the Illinois legislation was inconsistent since there were no registration re-
quirements for a self tender offer by the target corporation, and the Williams
Act had alfeady provided for material disclosure to all shareholders." The
Court therefore concluded that the act was unconstitutional because it imposed
45. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
46. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, §§ 137.51 to .70 (repealed 1983).
47. 457 U.S. at 643. Justice White, who delivered the opinion of the Court, found the
statute to be objectionable on both supremacy clause and commerce clause grounds. However,
a majority of the Justices only concurred with the commerce clause rationale. Only six of the
nine Justices actually decided the merits of the case since there was a threshold issue of whether
the controversy was moot. The status of the preemption challenge to state regulation of tender
offers was not conclusively resolved.
48. Id. at 634-36.
49. 397 U.S. 137 (1970). In Pike, the Supreme Court invalidated an Arizona act that
prohibited growers of cantaloupes in Arizona from shipping their goods out of state for
packaging. In making this determination, the court found that the "burden imposed on
[interstate] commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." Id. at 142.
50. MITE, 457 U.S. at 644-45. In Part V-A of Justice White's opinion, in which a majority
of the Court did not concur, the Illinois statute was deemed unconstitutional on the ground
that it directly interfered with interstate commerce. A state statute that directly burdens interstate
commerce is necessarily invalid regardless of the state's interest or purpose. Id. at 642-43 (citing
Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189, 199 (1925)).
51. 457 U.S. at 643 (citing Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of Target's Management
in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1173-74 (1981); Fischel, Efficient
Capital Market Theory, The Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender
Offers, 57 TExAs L. REV. 1, 5, 27-28, 45 (1978); H.R. Rep. No. 94-1373, p. 12 (1976)).
52. MITE, 457 U.S. at 644. Justice White stated that, "Insofar as the Illinois'law burdens
out-of-state transactions, there is nothing to be weighed in the balance to sustain the law." Id.
53. Id. at 645.
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a "substantial burden on interstate commerce which outweigh[ed] its putative
local benefits." '5 4 A majority of the Court did not, however, agree that the
Illinois statute was preempted by the Williams Act."
The impact of MITE was immediate and substantial. While MITE
arguably allowed some room for state regulation of tender offers, 6 sub-
sequent courts effectively precluded any such regulation.5 7 The first fed-
eral appellate court to decide the constitutionality of a state takeover
statute after the MITE decision was the Eighth Circuit in National City
Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp." The National City Lines court held that
the Missouri Takeover Bid Disclosure Act" was preempted by the Wil-
liams Act since Missouri allowed for delay in commencing the offer,
provided for additional disclosure requirements, and discriminated be-
tween the offeror and incumbent management with respect to the dis-
semination of information. 60 The court also summarily invalidated the
state act under the commerce clause since it was substantially similar
to the unconstitutional Illinois act. 6' National City Lines established the
trend for further judicial restriction of state regulation of tender of-
fers.
62
Subsequent to National City Lines, state legislatures structured their
takeover statutes to lessen the burdens on interstate commerce and to
54. Id. at 646.
55. See supra note 47. Only Justice White, Chief Justice Burger, and Justice Blackmun
joined in the preemption rationale.
56. 457 U.S. at 646 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell indicated that the Court's
commerce clause rationale left some room for state regulation. Also, Justice Stevens noted that
Congress' neutrality policy did not prohibit state protective legislation for incumbent manage-
ment. Id. at 655 (Stevens, J., concurring). See also, Warren, Developments in State Takeover
Regulation: MITE and Its Aftermath, 40 Bus. LAW. 671, 685-86 (1985).
57. See, e.g., Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Serv. Co., 715 F.2d 1425 (10th Cir. 1983)
(Oklahoma takeover statute declafed unconstitutional); Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d 576
(4th Cir. 1983) (Virginia statute held unconstitutional); Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp.,
690 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1982) (Michigan takeover act held unconstitutional); National City Lines,
Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982) (Missouri statute declared unconstitutional);
Sharon Steel v. Whaland, 466 A.2d 919 (N.H. 1983) (New Hampshire takeover statute held
unconstitutional); Esmark, Inc. v. Strode, 639 S.W.2d 768 (Ky. 1982) (Kentucky act found
unconsti tional).
58. 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982). National City Lines, Inc., a Delaware corporation,
commenced a tender offer for all of the outstanding common stock of LLC Corp. LLC was
also a Delaware corporation and had a subsidiary insurance company domiciled in Missouri.
Concurrent with the tender offer, National brought suit in the federal district court to enjoin
enforcement of the Missouri Takeover Act, and the district court ultimately granted the
preliminary injunction.
59. Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 405.500 to .565 (Vernon 1979).
60. 687 F.2d at 1128.
61. Id. The court did not analyze the commerce clause challenge, but merely invalidated
the Missouri act on the ground that there were "no sufficient distinctions between the Illinois
and Missouri Takeover Acts." Id.
62. See supra note 57.
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minimize conflicts with the Williams Act. 63 Yet, the judicial trend estab-
lished by MITE and National City Lines continued. In Martin-Marietta
Corp. v. Bendix Corp.,64 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals anticipated
and rejected the argument that an extraterritorial provision of the Mich-
igan Take-Over Offers Act 6 could be severed in order to render the
act, as a whole, constitutional. 66 The court stated that even an in-
junction that affected only resident shareholders could impermissibly
burden interstate commerce if the stock held by resident shareholders
was needed to comply with a "minimum number of shares" provision
in a nationwide offer. 67 In Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Service Co., 6
8
the Tenth Circuit struck down the Oklahoma Take-Over Bid Act 69 on
commerce clause grounds even though the act did not contain a pre-
commencement waiting period or provide for delayed hearings. 70 The
Mesa court stated that similar to the invalidated Illinois act, the Okla-
homa statute contained the fatal flaw of permitting a state to block a
nationwide offer under the guise of protecting resident shareholders.
Thus, while a dual system of takeover regulation theoretically existed,
the MITE decision and its progeny thwarted any attempts at state reg-
ulation. State takeover legislation was most commonly invalidated under
63. For additional discussion on state experimentation with takeover statutes, see infra notes
161-66 and accompanying text.
64. 690 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1982). The facts in Martin-Marietta were rather intriguing. On
August 25, 1982, Bendix Corporation commenced a tender offer for 54% of Martin-Marietta's
shares. Martin-Marietta, in turn, began a counter tender offer for 50% of the outstanding
stock of Bendix on August 30, 1982. At the same time that Martin-Marietta commenced the
counter tender offer, it also brought suit in the federal district court seeking injunctive relief
against enforcement of the Michigan Take-Over Offers Act. Relief was denied by the district
court, and Martin-Marietta thereupon enlisted the aid of United Technologies to commence a
second offer. The second request for injunctive relief was again denied on the ground that
Martin-Marietta and United Technologies had not shown that their allegations of the statute's
unconstitutionality would not likely succeed on its merits. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed.
65. MICH. CoMp. LAws ANN. §§ 451.901 to .918 (West Supp. 1983-84).
66. The extraterritorial provision that the court found objectionable stated: "An offeror
may not make a take-over offer which is not made to security holders in this state on substantially
the same terms as the offer is made to security holders outside this state." Id. § 451.911. The
court stated that the quoted provision expressly made the balance of the Michigan Act applicable
to out-of-state transactions, and that the state had no legitimate interest in protecting non-
resident shareholders. 690 F.2d at 566.
67. Since the acquiring party wants to ensure that it will gain control of the target corporation
through its cash tender offer, it will often condition the offer upon the event that enough
shares are tendered to enable the offeror to acquire at least 50% of the outstanding common
stock in the target. For a discussion of the mechanics involved in making cash tender offers
see E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 3.
68. 715 F.2d 1425 (10th Cir. 1983).
69. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 431 to 4509 (West 1981).
70. 715 F.2d at 1430 n.7.
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the commerce clause holding in MITE, but had also been held to be
preempted by the Williams Act.
CARDIFF ACQUISITIONS, INC. v. HATCH
7 1
Facts and Procedural History
On November 4, 1984, the plaintiff, Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. (Car-
diff) commenced a tender offer for all of the outstanding shares of
Conwed Corporation by filing a Schedule 14D-1 72 with the Securities
Exchange Commission (SEC). 73 Cardiff is a wholly owned subsidiary of
Cardiff Equities Corporation 74 and was formed by Cardiff Equities for
the purpose of making the subject tender offer. Both Cardiff and Car-
diff Equities are Delaware corporations with their principal places of
business in California. 7 The target of the tender offer, Conwed Cor-
poration (Conwed), also a Delaware corporation, had its principal place
of business in Minnesota.7 6
The material terms of the offer, as detailed in the Schedule 14D-l, provided
that all shares tendered before December 4, 1984 would be purchased by
Cardiff at $21.50 per share. 77 Cardiff, however, expressly conditioned the
tender offer upon a minimum number of shares being tendered by Conwed's
shareholders. 7s Also, Cardiff was permitted to commence purchasing the
offered shares on November 28, 1984, sixteen business days after commence-
ment of the offer. 79
In addition to filing the Schedule 14D-1 with the SEC, Cardiff also filed
a Registration Statement with the Minnesota Commissioner of Commerce
on November 5. The registration was required since Conwed was a "target
corporation" 0 as defined in the Minnesota Corporate Take-Overs Act.8'
Concurrent with filing the Registration Statement, Cardiff brought suit in
the federal district court of Minnesota seeking a temporary restraining order
71. 751 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1984).
72. Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch, 597 F. Supp. 1493, 1495 (1984). Schedule 14D-1 is
a form that a purchaser of shares must file if it intends to make a tender offer for the
outstanding shares of a target corporation.
73. Id.
74. The terms "plaintiff" and "Cardiff," as used herein, shall refer to both Cardiff
Acquisitions, Inc. and Cardiff Equities Corporation.
75. 597 F. Supp. at 1495.
76. Id. Also, at least 20% of Conwed's stock was held by Minnesota residents. Id. at 1496.
77. It is not clear from the record how much the offering price exceeded the market price
of Conwed's common stock.
78. 597 F. Supp. at 1495.
79. Id.
80. The Minnesota act defined a "target company" as "an issuer of publicly traded equity
securities which has at least 20 percent of its equity securities beneficially held by residents of
this state and has substantial assets in this state." MINN. STAT. § 80B.01(9).
81. 597 F. Supp. at 1496.
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against enforcement of the Minnesota act. Cardiff alleged that the takeover
act was unconstitutional. The district court denied the restraining order and
set a hearing date for the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. 2
However, prior to the preliminary injunction hearing, on November 8, 1984,
the Commissioner ordered temporary suspension of Cardiff's tender offer
in Minnesota on the ground that Cardiff had failed to make full disclosure
under the Take-Overs Act. 3
On November 15, 1984, the district court denied Cardiff's motion for a
preliminary injunction and also rejected its request for an injunction pending
appeal of the decision.8 4 The district court found that Cardiff had not shown
that it was likely to succeed on the merits of the controversy. 5 The court
analyzed and rejected Cardiff's interstate commerce and preemption chal-
lenges to the validity of the Minnesota act, and upheld the act's constitu-
tionality.86 Cardiff then moved for an expedited appeal and the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals granted that motion. 7
On appeal, in Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch,88 the Eighth Circuit
severed certain aspects of the Minnesota act that it determined were invalid
and upheld the constitutionality of the act as a whole.8 9 The court of appeals
thereby affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the complaint for preliminary
injunction.
Eighth Circuit's Rationale
In Cardiff, the Eighth Circuit determined that the Minnesota act was not
facially unconstitutional. In reaching this result, the court narrowly construed
82. Id. The preliminary injunction motion sought to enjoin the Commissioner of Commerce
and Attorney General of Minnesota from enforcing provisions of the act.
83. Id. The Commissioner then scheduled a hearing on the matter for November 16, 1984.
84. Id. at 1500. The parties had stipulated that the decision on the preliminary injunction
would also be dispositive of the request for permanent injunction.
85. Id. at 1497. The district court noted that the relevant factors in determining the issuance
of a preliminary injuriction were: I) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant, 2) the
resulting injury to the other parties, 3) the probability of the movant's success on the merits,
and 4) the public interest. Id. at 1496 (citing Dataphase Sys. Inc. v. CL Sys. Inc., 640 F.2d
109, 114 (8th Cir. 1981)). The district court stated that the merits criterion was dispositive in
the subject controversy since the other factors weighed equally for both parties. Id. at 1496-
97.
86. See 597 F. Supp. at 1498. With respect to Cardiff's interstate commerce challenge, the
court stated that although the Minnesota Commissioner's suspension of the offer could result
in the frustration of a nationwide tender offer and prevent shareholders of Conwed from
recognizing a premium on the sale of their stock, such burdens on interstate commerce were
merely incidental. Id. The court found that the state's interest in requiring the offeror to
disclose the impact that the tender offer would have specifically in Minnesota outweighed the
slight burdens on interstate commerce. Id. With respect to the supremacy clause challenge, the
court held that while some conflict did in fact exist between the Minnesota act and the Williams
Act, that conflict was not so material as to frustrate the Williams Act's purpose of providing
shareholder protection. Id.
87. Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1984).
88. M.
89. Id. at 909.
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the Take-Overs Act to be substantially consistent with the Williams Act, not
impermissibly burdensome on interstate commerce, and protective of local
shareholders' interests. 90 Judge Heaney, writing for the court, analyzed the
facial constitutionality of the act against interstate commerce and supremacy
clause challenges, and then addressed the issue of whether the statute had
been constitutionally applied by the Commissioner to Cardiff's tender offer.
The court first rejected Cardiff's interstate commerce challenge. The court
found that under the Supreme Court's holding in Edgar v. MITE Corp.,
which struck down the Illinois Business Takeover Act 9' as an impermissible
burden on interstate commerce, a state statute may incidentally affect inter-
state commerce so long as the local benefits resulting from the statute
outweighed those effects. 92 The court then indicated that Minnesota's take-
over act was carefully structured to minimize its extraterritorial impact, and
did not contain any of the provisions that the Supreme Court had previously
found objectionable." First, unlike the Illinois statute,94 the Minnesota act
does not require notification prior to filing the registration statement, and
prohibits both the offeror and the target corporation from disseminating
information while an offer is suspended. 9 Second, unlike the procedure
involved under the Illinois statute, 96 in Minnesota the registration becomes
effective at the time of filing. Also, although the Minnesota Commissioner
can temporarily suspend an offer, the entire hearing process must be com-
pleted within sixteen calendar days. 9 7 Any possible delay would therefore be
within the minimum required offering period of twenty business days that
is specified by the Williams Act. 9 Third, the court found that while the
Minnesota act provides the Commissioner with the authority to "prescribe
different time limits ' 99 than those previously mentioned, this provision was
90. Id. The court's narrow construction of the Minnesota act, as well as its severing of
several unconstitutional provisions and labeling certain acts by the Commissioner as "unau-
thorized" rather than unconstitutional, evidence its strained attempt to uphold the act's validity.
See infra text accompanying notes 119-57.
91. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, §§ 137.51 to -70 (repealed 1983).
92. 751 F.2d at 909, 911.
93. Id. at 909.
94. The Illinois act required the offeror to notify the Secretary of State, and the target, 20
days before commencing the offer. During this time period, only the incumbent management
was permitted to disseminate information regarding the offer. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, §§
137.54E, 137.54B (repealed 1983).
95. MINN. STAT. § 80B.05(4).
96. The Illinois act allowed the Secretary to postpone the effectiveness of a tender offer
indefinitely while it held hearings regarding the registration. ILL. REv.* STAT. ch. 121 1/2 §
137.57C-D.
97. MINN. STAT. § 80B.03(5).
98. The SEC requires an offer to be held open to the shareholder of a target corporation
for 20 business days. 17 C.F.R. § 240.143-1 (1984).
99. MINN. STAT. § 80B.03(5). The Minnesota act states, in relevant part, "the commissioner
may prescribe different time limits than those specificied in this subdivision by rule or order."
Id.
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used only to expedite hearings and not to delay the procedures.10E Fourth,
the Minnesota act did not authorize the suspension of tender offers on the
ground that they were inequitable or unfair, as did the Illinois act.10 Finally,
in contrast to the Illinois act,102 the Minnesota statute took effect only when
the target company had at least twenty percent of its shareholders and a
"substantial" amount of assets located in that state, or was domiciled in
the state.'0 3 The court therefore concluded that, contrary to the statute
rejected in MITE, the Minnesota act posed little threat of adversely affecting
interstate commerce.
In addition to pointing out the distinctions between the Illinois and
Minnesota statutes, the court also repudiated Cardiff's argument that al-
though the Minnesota statute's burdens may indeed be less, the fact that the
benefits derived from the act were merely de minimis should lead to the
same result as that obtained in MITE. Cardiff first argued that since most
of the information required to be disclosed under the Minnesota statute was
already covered by the Williams Act, the additional disclosure did not
enhance shareholder interest.' °4 The court noted, however, that resident
100. 751 F.2d at 911. The court first noted that the provision did not explicitly allow for
extensions and that expedited procedures had been used in the earlier case of Edudata Corp.
v. Scientific Computers, Inc., 746 F.2d 429 (8th Cir. 1984). Thus, Judge Heaney stated that
"we have no reason to believe the Minnesota Act will be applied in a manner which creates
burdensome delay." Cardiff, 751 F.2d at 911. Judge Heaney's proposition, however, relates to
the constitutionality of the provision as applied rather than its facial constitutionality.
101. 751 F.2d at 914. The court stated that the Commissioner was authorized to review the
adequacy of disclosure so long as it was limited to its sufficiency. This reasoning, however,
appears somewhat paradoxical since "sufficiency" and "adequacy" have two clearly distinct
meanings.
102. The Illinois act defined a target company more broadly than the Minnesota act. The
Illinois statute applied when 100o of a corporation's shares were held by Illinois residents or
when two of the following criteria were met: I) its principal executive office was in Illinois, 2)
it was incorporated in Illinois, or 3) at least ten percent of its stated capital and paid-in surplus
was in Illinois. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, § 137.52-10(2) (repealed 1983).
103. MINN. STAT. § 80B.01(9).
104. 751 F.2d at 911. The Minnesota act's disclosure requirements are as follows:
Under section 80B.03(6)(a)-(e), an offeror must disclose: (a) information about its
background and identity; (b) the source of the funds to be used in making the
purchase and the material terms of any financing arrangements; (c) the purpose of
the purchase and the offeror's plans for the business, including any plans to liquidate
the company, to make major changes in its corporate structure or to materially
alter its relationship with suppliers, customers, or communities in which it operates;
(d) the extent of the offeror's holdings in the target company; and (e) the material
terms of any contract, arrangement, or understanding with any other person with
respect to the equity securities or the issuer whereby the person filing the statement
has or will acquire any interest in additional equity securities of the issuer, or is or
will be obligated to transfer any interest in the equity securities to another.
Id. at 911 n.5. In addition, § 80B.03(2)(c) requires:
[I]nformation concerning [the offeror'sl organization and operations, including the
year, form and jurisdiction of its organization, a description of each class of equity
security and long term debt, a description of the business conducted by the offeror
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shareholders would be protected by simultaneous enforcement of state and
federal disclosure requirements since the SEC did not have the resources to
effectively evaluate all of the forms. 0 Cardiff also contended that the
additional disclosure requirements (those not covered by the Williams Act)
were clearly burdensome on interstate commerce and did not serve a legiti-
mate function. The court rejected this argument by stating that the additional
information, which related to the economic impact that the tender offer
would have on the state, aided shareholders in deciding whether to sell their
stock."°6 Thus, the circuit court rejected Cardiff's argument that the Min-
nesota Corporate Take-Overs Act was facially violative of the interstate
commerce clause.
The second phase of the court's analysis centered on the facial validity of
the Minnesota act under the supremacy clause. The court's determinations
under this analysis are particularly interesting in that while certain provisions
of the act were found to be unconstitutional, the act itself was deemed valid
under the supremacy clause.0 7 The court first noted that section 28(a) of
the 1934 Act,' which allowed state regulation of securities so long as it did
not conflict with federal law, clearly applied to the Williams Act. The court
also indicated that the MITE decision did not divulge the Supreme Court's
stance on the preemption issue since the majority had only agreed on the
interstate commerce challenge.' °9
The Cardiff court, however, did recognize that its prior decision in Na-
tional City Lines v. LLC Corp.," 0 in which the Missouri Takeover Bid
Disclosure Act"' was invalidated in part on the ground that it was preempted
by the Williams Act, was somewhat relevant to the present controversy. The
Cardiff court first noted that National City Lines was distinguishable since
and its subsidiaries and any material changes therein during the past three years, a
description of the location and character of the principal properties of the offeror
and its subsidiaries, a description of any material pending legal or administrative
proceedings in which the offeror or any of its subsidiaries is a party, the names of
all directors and executive officers of the offeror and their material business activities
and affiliations during the past three years, and financial statements of the offeror
in such form and for such period of time as the commissioner may by rule
prescribe[.]
Id. at 911 n.5. The Williams Act, on the other hand, requires disclosure of the offeror's
background and identity, its source of offering funds, its purpose in seeking control, and the
extent of the offeror's holdings in the target company.
105. 751 F.2d at 912. The court cited Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 741 F.2d
707 (5th Cir. 1984), in which the SEC filed an amicus brief stating that it could not police the
truthfulness of all 13(d) reports.
106. 751 F.2d at 912.
107. Id. at 915.
108. See supra note 19.
109. 751 F.2d at 913. See supra note 47.
110. 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982). For an analysis of the Eighth Circuit's holding in National
City Lines, see supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
I l1. Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 409.500 to .565 (Vernon 1979).
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the Missouri statute was very similar to the Illinois statute struck down in
MITE. " 2 Yet, the court did find certain provisions in the Minnesota act that
authorized the Commissioner to prescribe additional disclosure requirements
to be unconstitutional because they resembled provisions similar to those in
the Missouri act. These sections were held to be unconstitutionally vague.','
The Cardiff court upheld the remaining disclosure requirements, and also
found that it was permissible for the Commissioner to evaluate the sufficiency
of the information disclosed." 4
With respect to the constitutionality of the Minnesota statute as applied,
Judge Heaney found some aspects to be "unauthorized," but upheld its
overall application. "s The court affirmed the Commissioner's finding that
Cardiff had disclosed insufficient facts regarding its source of financing and
its plans to liquidate Conwed after gaining control." 6 The Commissioner's
demand that Cardiff characterize certain lawsuits and discuss their "value
and propriety," however, was deemed to be beyond the authority granted
by the act."17 Similarly, the court found the Commissioner's request that
Cardiff disclose that its potential two-tier tender offer violated the act was
also beyond the Commissioner's authority."'
Thus, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Minnesota Cor-
porate Take-Overs Act was constitutional both on its face and as applied.
The court determined that the slight burdens on interstate commerce were
outweighed by the state's legitimate interest in protecting its resident share-
holders. The facial validity of the takeover act withstood supremacy clause
challenges even though certain provisions were deemed unconstitutionally
vague. The court also found that the act had been constitutionally applied
even though certain acts of the Commissioner were deemed to be "unau-
thorized" by the statute.
112. 751 F.2d at 913. The court in National City Lines summarily upheld the interstate
commerce challenge since the Missouri act resembled the Illinois act.
113. 751 F.2d at 914.
114. See supra note 101. The court qualified the Commissioner's power of review by stating
that he "has no authority to suspend the effectiveness of a tender offer on the ground that the
quality of the facts alleged do not satisfy him." 751 F.2d at 914.
115. 751 F.2d at 914-16. The court's characterization of certain acts by the Commissioner
as "unauthorized" allowed the court to avoid the issue of the Minnesota act's constitutionality
as applied. The distinction between "unauthorized" and unconstitutional, however, is not at
all clear.
116. Id. at 915.
117. Id. at 916.
118. Id. A "two-tier" offer essentially involves a cash tender offer followed by a merger in
which shareholders who did not initially tender their stock receive the securities of the offering
corporation at a value less than the initial offering price. This form of acquisition raises
potential fairness problems under the Williams Act. See Steinberger, Corporate Takeovers-Cash
Tender Offers, Exchange Offers, and Target Defense, in BusiNEss AcQuISmoNs 167 (2d ed. &
Supp. 1983).
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ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF THE CARDIFF DECISION
The Eighth Circuit's holding in Cardiff, while philosophically innovative,
is inconsistent with prior law."19 The decision is not only incompatible with
its previous holding in National City Lines, but also reflects an unsound
application of the MITE holding. The Cardiff decision does, however,
support the legitimate proposition that there are some limitations to the far-
reaching implications of MITE.'20
To begin with, the court's analysis of Cardiff's interstate commerce chal-
lenge was incomplete. While the court correctly found that the burdens
resulting from the Minnesota act were not as material as those under the
invalidated Illinois statute, the court did not adequately identify what the
remaining burdens were and how they were outweighed by the state's interest.
One potential adverse effect of the act that the court should have considered
is that one corporation could be delayed or prohibited from acquiring the
shares of another corporation by a state in which neither was incorporated., 2'
For example, in the subject case, a Minnesota statute was invoked by one
Delaware corporation to frustrate another Delaware corporation's hostile
tender offer. A second burden is that if the minimum number of shares are
not tendered because of the Minnesota act, nonresident and resident share-
holders of Conwed would be denied the opportunity to realize a premium
upon the sale of their stock to Cardiff. 2 2 Also, as the district court indicated,
"the very existence of the Minnesota Act may tend to limit the number of
takeover attempts of corporations which have a substantial nexus with the
state," and thereby lessen the efficiency of incumbent management. 23 An
additional burden that would result from application of state takeover
statutes in general would be the onerous task of complying with various
state disclosure requirements and litigating the numerous legal controversies
that would arise in each state. 2
119. See supra notes 42-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the law prior to
Cardiff
120. While MITE was limited to the validity of state takeover regulation in particular, one
federal district court has gone so far as to say that federal regulation of securities has superseded
state legislation in general. See Warren, supra note 56, at 685 (citing Conkling v. Moseley,
Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 760, 761 (D. Mass. 1983)).
121. Justice White supported the belief that the Illinois Act directly burdened interstate
commerce by noting that "the Commerce Clause also precludes the application of a state statute
to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State's borders, whether or not the commerce
has effects within the State." MITE, 457 U.S. at 642-43. Despite the fact that this part of
Justice White's opinion as applied to the Illinois statute was not joined in by a majority of the
Court, the statement itself is nonetheless valid as a premise of constitutional law.
122. Id. at 643.
123. Cardiff, 597 F. Supp. at 1495. The deterrent effect that state takeover statutes may
have on future hostile corporate acquisitions is discussed infra in the "Impact" section of this
Recent Case.
124. See MITE, 457 U.S at 642. The Court opined that "if Illinois may impose such
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The court did not address these factors in its interstate commerce analysis.
Instead, the court merely elucidated the discrepancies between the Illinois
and Minnesota takeover acts and repudiated the alleged burdens that would
ensue from one state's disclosure requirements. Even in these areas, however,
the court's findings are tenuous. For instance, the court approved state
disclosure requirements that duplicate those required by the Williams Act. 25
Yet, while the burden of providing such information is not great, the state's
interest in demanding it would be nonexistent. The Cardiff court, however,
justified such disclosure by asserting that the SEC's inadequate review of
federal disclosure forms fails to adequately protect resident shareholders.' 6
This proposition, however, directly conflicts with the Eighth Circuit's pre-
vious statement in National City Lines that state agencies should not second-
guess SEC determinations. 27 Also, the court's statement that additional
disclosure requirements pertaining to the economic impact of the tender offer
in Minnesota would help resident shareholders decide whether or not to sell
their stock is unsound. Shareholders hold stock for investment purposes;
only -information that relates to the potential profitability of the transaction
is relevant. 21 Considerations regarding the effect of tender offers on em-
ployees and suppliers do not reflect the state's interest in protecting its
shareholders, but merely evidence its protectionistic approach to securities
regulation. That the state was not primarily interested in shareholder pro-
tection is also reflected in the act's failure to prohibit target corporations
from commencing tender offers for their own shares without registration
and disclosure requirements. 29
regulations, so may other States; and interstate commerce in securities transactions generated
by tender offers would be thoroughly stifled." See also Note, supra note 35, at 1018 (stating
that the potential for chaos and balkanization that could result from different, yet concurrent,
state takeover statutes is proper grounds for concern).
125. The principal additional disclosure requirements that the Minnesota act contained were
those pertaining to the economic effects that the tender offer would have in that state. See
supra note 104 for a detailed discussion of Minnesota's disclosure requirements.
126. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
127. The court in National City Lines stated that Missouri's attempt to second guess material
disclosure requirements promulgated by the SEC could not stand. 687 F.2d at 1132 (citing
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 152, 171 (1963)).
128. It is ironic that the best support for the proposition that additional disclosure require-
ments are invalid is set forth in the Eighth Circuit's prior holding in National City Lines, in
which the court stated:
However, '[dlisclosure of a mass of irrelevant data can confuse the investor and
obscure relevant disclosures.' . . . Similarly, the Supreme Court warned in TSC
Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448, 96 S.Ct. 2126, 2131, 48
L.Ed.2d 757 (1976), that excessive disclosure requirements 'may accomplish more
harm than good' by confusing shareholders. Such a result conflicts with the Williams
Act's goal of unfettered choice by well-informed investors.
Id. at 1131 (citations omitted).
129. See MITE, 457 U.S. at 644. Justice White, writing for a majority, stated that the Illinois
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The court's analysis of Cardiff's supremacy clause challenge is similarly
underdeveloped, and is also somewhat unusual. While the court conceded
that certain provisions in the Minnesota act unconstitutionally empower the
Commissioner to prescribe disclosure requirements not delineated in the
federal Williams Act, 3 ' the court upheld the validity of the takeover act as
a whole.' 3' The basis for the court's authority to sever from a statute certain
sections that would otherwise render it unconstitutional is not clear. 32 The
court apparently distinguished these provisions from those employed in the
invalidated Missouri statute on the ground that they were unconstitutionally
vague rather than violative of the supremacy clause. 33
Apart from the severability issue, the court's discussion of Cardiff's
preemption challenge under the supremacy clause was not comprehensive.
A threshold issue that the court only summarily addressed was the possibility
that § 28(a) of the 1934 Act, 3 4 which granted states concurrent jurisdiction
in securities regulation, was not applicable to the Williams Act. While support
for the proposition that the Williams Act explicitly preempted state cash
tender offer regulation is not strong,131 the mere existence of such arguments
is indicative of the more common notion that general securities regulation
and tender offer regulation are distinct areas.
act's exemption of a corporation's acquisition of its own shares was inconsistent with the
avowed legislative intent of protecting shareholders. But see Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch,
597 F. Supp. 1493,-1499-1500 (D. Minn. 1985) (stating that an exemption for self tender offers
is not inconsistent with the Williams Act since the target's shareholders already know all the
relevant data pertaining to the transaction).
130. 751 F.2d at 914.
131. Id. In summarizing the court's analysis of the facial validity of the Minnesota act,
Judge Heaney stated, "because we find that the Act is, with a few exceptions, constitutional
on its face, we must also analyze whether the Act is constitutional as applied ..... Id.
132. While the Supreme Court in Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 290 (1923), stated that
"a statute bad in part is not necessarily void in its entirety," it also noted that valid provisions
cannot be severed from unconstitutional sections unless the legislature intended that unobjec-
tionable provisions stand when others are invalidated. Unlike the situation in Dorchy, in which
the Court did allow severance, the Minnesota act contains no expression of legislative intent to
let valid provisions stand when others are deemed unconstitutional. See Martin-Marietta Corp.
v. Bendix, 690 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1982) (rejecting the argument that an extraterritorial provision
could be severed to render the statute constitutional); Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577
F.2d 1256, 1285-86 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United
Corp. 443 U.S. 173 (1979). But see Note, Securities Law and the Constitution: State Tender
Offer Statutes Reconsidered, 88 YALE L.J. 510, 527 (1979) (stating that a commerce clause
analysis should be applied to separate provisions of state takeover statute rather than the entire
act).
133. It is not clear, however, what distinction there is between the concepts of vagueness
and preemption with respect to the severability issue.
134. See supra note 19.
135. The Williams Act does not explicitly mention the preemption issue and it has therefore
been assumed that § 28(A) was meant to apply to the Act. See MITE, 457 U.S. at 631.
However, as noted in Langevoort, supra note 35, at 247, the applicability of 28(A) to tender
offers is questionable since it was enacted in 1934 to preserve state blue sky laws, before state
takeover statutes existed. See also Note, supra note 132, at 519 n.63 (stating that courts often
treat such savings clauses as inapplicable in preemption issues).
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Whether or not state tender offer regulation is preempted outright by the
Williams Act, the Minnesota statute is in effect preempted if it conflicts with
the federal regulation or frustrates its objectives.'3 6 While the Eighth Circuit
correctly pointed out that the MITE Court did not invalidate the Illinois act
under the supremacy clause,'7 the preemption tests articulated by Justice
White are still pertinent. The Cardiff court's avoidance of the standards
applied in MITE on the ground that the Supreme Court Justices did not
agree on the purpose of the Williams Act was therefore not justified. The
court should have focused its preemption analysis on the issue of whether
the Minnesota statute frustrated the purposes or procedures of the Williams
Act.' Instead of applying the MITE analysis, however, the court looked
toward its prior holding in National City Lines for support in rejecting the
preemption argument. 3 9
Had the Cardiff court applied the traditional preemption tests outlined in
MITE, it would first have determined whether it was procedurally possible
for an offeror to comply with both the Minnesota Take-overs Act and the
federal Williams Act.'1° Since an offer immediately takes effect upon regis-
tration under the Minnesota act, and the potential hearing process must be
completed within the offering time frame prescribed by federal law, there
are no apparent procedural conflicts.' 4' This finding, however, is not dis-
positive of the preemption analysis, for if the Minnesota act frustrates the
purposes of the Williams Act it must still be invalidated.' 42
The Williams Act has the dual purpose of protecting shareholders and
maintaining a neutral balance between the offering and target corporations.' 43
Justice Powell's statement in MITE that the Williams Act neutrality stance
could encompass state legislation that protects incumbent management is
both inherently illogical and unsupported by the Williams Act's legislative
136. See MITE, 457 U.S. at 631. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
384-86 (1978).
137. See supra note 47.
138. 457 U.S. at 631. The MITE Court stated that a state statute is invalid if it actually
conflicts with a valid federal act and cited Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158
(1978), for the proposition that:
A conflict will be found 'where compliance with both federal and state regulation
is a physical impossibility,' . . . or where the state 'law stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.'
457 U.S. at 631 (citations omitted).
139. However, as discussed infra at notes 154-57 and accompanying text, the court's reliance
on National City Lines was equally unpersuasive.
140. See MITE, 457 U.S. at 631.
141. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text for a comparison of the requirements of
the Minnesota act and the Williams Act.
142. MITE, 457 U.S. at 631.
t43. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text for an analysis of the dual purpose of
the Williams Act.
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history. 44 Moreover, the Eighth Circuit's reliance on Justice Powell's state-
ment to avoid entirely the application of the traditional preemption test was
unsound. Rather, the court should have measured the effects of the Min-
nesota act against the objectives of the Williams Act to decide whether a
conflict in fact existed. 45
An examination of the Minnesota legislature's intent in passing the act
would commence an analysis of whether a conflict existed. The Minnesota
legislature's "findings" with respect to takeovers evidence an intent to protect
incumbent management. 46 In fact, of the eight legislative findings, only two
are concerned with the economic interests of shareholders. 47 The remaining
findings are concerned with such potential problems as exaggerated "focus
on short-term [corporate] performance," the employment of the state's
citizens, the viability of its industry, and other economic implications for
the state.'14  While these may be legitimate state interests in other contexts,
they are clearly contrary to the Williams Act's dual purpose of protecting
shareholders and maintaining a neutral balance between the opposing par-
ties. 49
The Minnesota act also conflicts with the Williams Act in numerous other
respects. First, as both the MITE Court and the legislative history indicate,
the Williams Act was expressly designed to prevent unreasonable delay in
144. MITE, 457 U.S. at 646-47 (Powell, J., concurring). Any state legislation "designed to
assure ... greater protection to interests that include . . . those of incumbent management"
would necessarily be detrimental to the raider and therefore tip the delicate balance created by
the Williams Act. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
145. The test, as articulated by Justice White in MITE, is whether the state statute "frustrates
the objectives of the Williams Act in some substantial way." 457 U.S. at 632.
146. The Minnesota legislature's "findings" are as follows:
The legislature finds that take-overs, particularly hostile take-overs: (1) exaggerate
the tendency of many businesses to focus on short-term performance to the detriment
of such long-term societal interests as increased research and development, improved
productivity, and the modernization of physical plant and employee capabilities;
(2) are often inconsistent with the economic interests of shareholders; (3) in many
instances threaten the jobs and careers of Minnesota citizens and undermine the
ethical foundations of companies, as when jobs are eliminated and career commit-
ments to employees are breached or ignored; (4) often result in plant closings or
consolidations that damage communities dependent on the jobs and taxes provided
by these plants; (5) not infrequently wipe out long-standing customer/supplier
relationships and the stability and continuity which these relationships provide
throughout society; (6) frequently tie up billions of dollars of scarce capital that
could 'be more effectively applied; (7) all too often stifle, and ultimately destroy,
the entreprenuerial, innovative spirit of creative individuals in independent firms;
and (8) are usually conducted in an atmosphere and pursuant to laws that do not
provide a reasonable opportunity for affected parties to make informed decisions.
147. See supra note 146, "findings" number 2 and number 8.
148. See supra note 146.
149. The state's interest in protecting its fiscal integrity by keeping corporations that supply
both tax revenues and substantial employment within its jurisdiction is clearly inconsistent with
the mandates of the Williams Act. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
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tender offers since additional time provides the target company with a
powerful weapon to combat takeovers.5 10 It is quite apparent, however, that
the Minnesota Commissioner's authority to suspend a tender offer within
his jurisdiction could delay, and possibly ruin, an otherwise valid tender
offer. Second, the Minnesota act does not regulate a target company's tender
offer for its own outstanding shares. This omission reveals that shareholder
protection and offeror/target neutrality are not the main concerns of the
act.'
5
'
Finally, the Minnesota act's disclosure requirements also conflict with the
Williams Act. The Williams Act requires the disclosure of very specific
information so as not to undermine the balance between the bidder and
incumbent management; limited disclosure also prevents shareholders from
being overwhelmed with irrelevant information.5 2 The Minnesota act's ad-
ditional disclosure requirements, however, violate both of these precepts.
For example, information relating to the economic impact of the tender
offer on the state is simply not relevant to an investment decision and
therefore serves only to confuse the shareholder.' The additional irrelevant
disclosure could also sway shareholders not to tender their stock and thereby
upset the delicate balance created by the Williams Act. Thus, application of
the traditional preemption analysis, which the Cardiff court chose to ignore,
suggests that the Minnesota act would violate the supremacy clause and
therefore be unconstitutional.
Even under the Eighth Circuit's explicit approach in deciding the preemp-
tion issue, however, the court's conclusion is not justified by the facts. In
its preemption analysis, the court relied paradoxically on its prior decision
in National City Lines, in which the Missouri Takeover Bid Disclosure Act
was invalidated under both the supremacy clause and commerce clause.,5 4
The court rejected Cardiff's argument that the Minnesota act contained
provisions that were strikingly similar to those that doomed the constitu-
tionality of the Missouri act.' 55 The court found that the Missouri act's
provisions were "much broader and more open-ended."' 5 6 In the very next
150. See MITE, 457 U.S at 636-38 (outlining in detail the legislative intent to avoid delay in
tender offers since delay can frustrate valid corporate acquisitions). See also Langevoort, supra
note 35, at 238.
151. See supra note 129.
152. See supra note 128 for a discussion of the Eighth Circuit's prior deFision in National
City Lines, in which the court supported its proposition that additional state disclosure require-
ments are contrary to shareholder protection.
153. Supra note 128 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of the National City
Lines decision.
155. The Missouri statute provided for disclosure of "such additional information as the
commissioner may require as necessary in the public interest or for the protection of investors."
Mo. REV. STAT. § 409.515 (1979).
156. 751 F.2d at 914. The Minnesota provision was essentially the same as the invalidated
Missouri section in that it permitted the commissioner to require other disclosure that would
affect shareholders' evaluations. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80B.034(A).
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paragraph, however, the Cardiff court did find that the Minnesota provisions
were unconstitutionally vague. 57 Therefore, apart from the unusual way in
which the court severed unconstitutional provisions from the Minnesota act,
the analysis is also inherently inconsistent and contrary to its prior decision
in National City Lines.
While the Cardiff decision was admittedly rendered on an expedited basis,
the lack of an in-depth analysis of the prior law in the area and the application
of only a cursory review of Cardiff's arguments rendered the decision both
incomplete and inconsistent. While the decision admittedly serves as an
acknowledgement that there are some parameters to a comprehensive federal
securities regulatory scheme, its condonation of the Minnesota act permitted
an over-extension of state authority to regulate tender offers.
IMPACT OF THE CARDIFF DECISION
While the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals' holding in Cardiff is decidedly
contrary to the current trend in other jurisdictions,18 it could have a sub-
stantial impact in numerous areas. First, the decision has profound impli-
cations for the federalism issues surrounding securities regulation. The dual
federal/state system of regulating securities, while presumably extended to
the cash tender offer under the Williams Act,' 59 was severely restricted by
judicial determinations. The Cardiff decision, however, suggests that states
may in fact play a substantial role in the regulation of nationwide corporate
takeovers when they affect resident shareholders. Residual state authority to
regulate tender offers under the police power is therefore substantially in-
creased. 60 While the split of judicial opinion in the federal circuits as to the
validity of post-MITE takeover acts suggests further clarification by the
Supreme Court, the exact roles of state and federal governments will remain
unclear. Since state regulation of tender offers is essentially duplicative of
the federal scheme in many respects, and conflicts with the Williams Act in
others, it is submitted that explicit Congressional preemption in this area
would alleviate much of the federalism ambiguities.
The Cardiff decision will also significantly influence future state takeover
legislation. Subsequent to MITE, state legislatures experimented with differ-
ent types of statutes to regulate corporate takeovers.' 6' In addition to the
157. 751 F.2d at 914.
158. See supra note 44 for a list of judicial invalidations of state takeover statutes.
159. Section 28(A) of the 1934 Act arguably preserves state authority to regulate tender
offers. See supra notes 19 and 135 and accompanying text.
160. For a discussion of the limits of state power to regulate commerce, see Note, supra
note 35, at 1014 n. 165. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 136, at 319-36.
161. Approximately eight states have passed takeover legislation since Mite. See HAWAII REV.
STAT. §§ 417E-1 to -15 (1976 & Supp. 1984); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 7.85 (1985); Ky. REV.
STAT. §§ 271A.396 to .399 (Supp. 1984); LA. REV. STAT. §§ 51:1500 to :1512 (West Supp.
1985); MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 3-601 to -603 (Supp. 1984-85); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
351.407 (Vernon Supp. 1985-86); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.83.1 to .83.2 (1985); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1408(B), 1409.1(C), 1910 (Purdon Supp. 1984-85).
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statutes invalidated in Bendix 62 and Mesa Petroleum, 163 states have attempted
to circumvent the MITE decision in several other ways. For instance, states
have included anti-takeover provisions in their corporation acts rather
than their securities acts,' 64 regulated only certain harmful aspects of
takeovers such as two-tier tender offers, 6 or increased the nexus require-
ments of target corporations to the state.' 66 Since the validity of these
innovative takeover provisions has not yet been determined, future state
legislation will probably be modeled after the Minnesota act rather than the
untested, more creative statutes.' 67 If other states follow Minnesota's lead,
it is probable that either an irreconcilable conflict between the federal circuits
will develop, or a new judicial trend in the area of state regulation of tender
offers will be established.
Perhaps the most profound impact that could result from the Cardiff
decision is its potential practical ramifications on corporate acquisitions. The
battles between corporate "raiders" and incumbent target management are
currently the focus of national attention and have spawned voluminous
articles on the benefits and drawbacks of such acquisitions.' 6 At the heart
of the takeover controversy lies the question of what steps the target man-
agement may validly take to prevent a hostile takeover. While the decisions
of corporate directors have traditionally been upheld so long as a rational
business judgment was advanced,' 69 this standard has been criticized in the
context of hostile tender offers. In such situations, the business judgment
162. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
164. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.83.1 to .83.2 (1985). The Ohio Control Share
Acquisition Act provides a "mechanism for shareholder review of proposed control share
acquisitions." Note, Has Ohio A voided the Wake of MITE? An Analysis of the Constitutionality
of the Ohio Control Share Acquisition Act, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 203, 207 (1985) (arguing that
Ohio's new legislation is constitutional).
In addition, Illinois recently passed legislation patterned, in some aspects, after the Pennsyl-
vania takeover legislation, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1408(B), 1409.1(C), 1910 (Purdon Supp.
1984-85). The Illinois legislation is included in the state's corporation laws and essentially
regulates second step transactions in takeovers, such as mergers and sales of assets, to protect
interested shareholders. For analyses of the Pennsylvania statute, see Comment, The 1983
Amendments to Pennsylvania's Business Corporation Law: Unconstitutional? MITE Be, 89
DICK. L. REV. 401 (1985), and Steinberg, supra note 37.
165. See MD. CoRPs. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. §§ 3-601 to 3-603 (Supp. 1984). The Maryland
statute regulates the second-stage "freeze outs" or forced mergers that often follow tender
offers. See Note, Second Generation State Takeover Legislation: Maryland Takes a New Tack,
83 MICH. L. REV. 433 (1985).
166. See The Wisconsin Corporate Take-Over Law, WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 551.01 to .25 (West
Special Pamphlet 1983).
167. HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 417E-1 to -15 (1976 & Supp. 1984).
168. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 24; Lipton, supra note 24; E. ARANOW & H.
EINHORN, supra note 3.
169. See Lipton, supra note 24.
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rule enables target managements to protect their own employment at the
expense of shareholder profits.170
Courts have recently upheld many of the defensive tactics that incumbent
management have used to thwart hostile tender offers. 7' Yet, due to
judicial restriction, state takeover regulation has not played a significant
role in these control battles. The Cardiff decision, however, may encourage
states to use their takeover acts as a shield to protect domestic businesses
from takeover attempts. As a long-range preventive measure, or even upon
immediate threat of takeover, companies could reincorporate in states with
strong anti-takeover legislation. The Eighth Circuit's holding in Cardiff
would provide a strong deterrent to hostile takeover attempts in jurisdictions
with statutes similar to Minnesota's.
As a corollary to the proposition that corporations would migrate to states
with stringent takeover regulation, it is also apparent that other states would
pass similar statutes to preserve their own fiscal integrity. The resulting case
law would attempt to define the parameters of valid state tender offer
regulation, but the determinations in different jurisdictions would vary.
Therefore, it is possible that the use of state regulation as a defensive
weapon in control battles would incite the adoption of these statutes in other
states. The result would be an increase in litigation surrounding hostile
takeovers. This, in turn, would raise the cost of corporate acquisitions to a
point that could render them economically unfeasible. The uncertainty and
expense of litigating in every state with a seemingly valid takeover act could
deter numerous acquisitions and result in inefficient corporate management.
Congressional preemption of tender offer legislation would alleviate both
the problem of disparity in judicial determinations concerning the validity
of state takeover acts and create a healthier economic environment for
corporate management.
CONCLUSION
In Cardiff, the Eighth Circuit rejected the recent judicial trend of restricting
state regulation of corporate takeovers. Yet, an analysis of the opinion itself,
as well as its potential impact on securities regulation, reveals that the court's
holding was not justified from a legal or economic perspective. The Eighth
Circuit's prior decision in National City Lines and the Supreme Court's
holding in MITE both mandate that the Minnesota act be deemed uncon-
170. The "business judgment rule" has been attacked as being inappropriate in hostile
acquisitions since the directors of the target corporation may have a conflict of interest in
choosing to defend against a takeover. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 24; Gilson, The
Case Against Shark Repellant Amendments: Structural Limitations On The Enabling Concept,
34 STAN. L. REV. 775, 805 (1982).
171. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1092 (1982); Siebert v. Milton Bradley Co., 405 N.E.2d 131 (Mass. 1980); Young v. Valhi, 382
A.2d 1372 (Del. Ch. 1978).
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stitutional. The adverse effects that the decision could have on future cor-
porate acquisitions also weigh against the propriety of the court's holding. In
conclusion, it is submitted that Congress should enact legislation to preempt
state regulation of tender offers in order to facilitate future judicial deter-
minations and thereby relieve many of the burdens associated with the
acquisition of corporations. Explicit federal preemption of cash tender offer
regulation would protect interested shareholders, encourage efficient man-
agement, and foster a healthy national economy.
Thomas V. Donnelly
